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II. STATEMENT OF THE COURTS' JURISDICTION 
This is a domestic law case for which an Appeal lies directly to this court pursuant to 
UCA §78-2a-3(2)(h). This case involves two (2) separate Appeals which have been 
consolidated. The separately filed Appeals are identified in Case No. 20000313CA and Case 
No. 200003 MCA. The consolidation order was entered by this Court on May 9,2000. The 
Notice of Appeal are both dated April 4, 2000. 
NOTE: The two (2) separate trial transcripts are divided into several volumes. The 
Court transcript relating to the motion for a new trial and the evidentiary hearing involving 
the contempt matters is identified in this brief as "Contempt Trial p. ". The trial transcript 
for the divorce action if referred to in this brief as "Divorce Trial p. ". 
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. The Issues Presented on Appeal as to Civil Contempt and Related Sanctions. 
1. Whether the District Court obtained subject matter and personal jurisdiction 
over the appellant under the Orders to Show Cause under the controlling facts of the case. 
(Contempt Trial pp. 50 to 51, and 54 to 56; Record pp. 1246 to 1248, and 1266 to 1290). 
2. Whether the Respondent complied with the mandatory provisions of UCA §78-
32-1 et. seq. regarding contempt and any related sanctions. (Record pp. 1246 to 1248). 
3. Whether or not the conduct actually complained about can support a claim of 
contempt as a matter of law and under the Decree of Divorce. (Record pp. 46 to 48). 
4. Whether the elements of civil contempt as to specific events was proven by 
clear and convincing evidence. (Record pp. 1246 to 1248, and 1266 to 1290). 
5. Whether there was adequate findings of facts made by the trial court and 
whether they are sufficient to support its ruling and any subsequent punishment regarding 
contempt. (Record pp. 1246 to 1248). 
6. Whether Respondent acquiesced to the conduct and if this constituted a defense 
(in whole or in part) to the claim of contempt. (Record pp. 1246 to 1248, and 1266 to 1290). 
7. Whether or not the District Court acted properly by requiring the Petitioner to 
present her evidence in defense of contempt before the Respondent presented even a prima 
facia case of contempt. (Contempt Trial pp. 54 to 55). 
8. Whether under state law and the facts the Appellant was afforded due process 
of law. (Contempt Trial pp. 42 to 43 and 49 to 57). (Record pp. 1246 to 1248). 
9. Whether the trial court should have awarded the wife her attorney's fees 
incurred in defending the contempt matter on account of the failure of the moving party to 
comply with the mandatory provisions of UCA §78-32-1 et. seq. (Record pp. 1294 to 1301). 
B. The Issues Presented on Appeal as to the Divorce Action and the Decree of Divorce. 
1. Whether the District Court properly vacated the wife's temporary spousal 
support award that had accrued during the pendency of the case. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148). 
2. Whether the wife was properly denied a permanent award of alimony in light 
of the length of the marriage and the desperate earning abilities and demonstrated disparate 
financial resources which are available to the parties. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148). 
3. Whether the property division was reasonable in light of the facts of the case 
and earning abilities of the parties, taking into account the income producing nature of the 
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assets and the award of the business assets to the Respondent. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148). 
4. Whether the District Court failed to find that the Respondent's income was at 
least $5,000.00 per month based upon the evidence, admissions, and admitted trial exhibits. 
(Record pp. 1139 to 1148). 
5. Whether the Court awarded sufficient attorney's fees to the wife in light of the 
facts of this case and the difficulty in ascertaining the Respondent's true and verifiable 
current and historical income due to his admitted use of corporations and nominee trusts. 
(Record pp. 1139 to 1148). 
6. Whether child support award was properly computed based upon the actual and 
historical income of the parties as shown by the trial evidence. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148). 
7. Whether the Court failed to recognize and then treat as the income of the 
Respondent the corporate, trust, and business funds paid or diverted to numerous third 
parties. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148). 
8. Whether the Court took into account the fact that the Respondent has 
significant premarital income producing real estate and that such was required to be taken 
into account in setting the level of child support and alimony. (Record 1139 to 1148). 
9. Whether or not the Respondent had an affirmative duty under the law to 
provide current and historic financial information so that his support obligations could be 
determined and whether he breached such duty, and whether the adverse inference rule was 
properly applied by the Trial Court. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148, and 1154 to 1156). 
10. Whether the Court properly awarded the tax exemption to a spouse who admits 
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he does not file tax returns and has no actual need for the same. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148). 
11. Whether the Court should have awarded prejudgment interest on the support 
arrearages at 10% compounded monthly. (Record p. 1142). 
12. Whether the Court properly applied the law to the facts of the case. (Record 
pp. 1139 toll48). 
13. The failure to award costs in the sum of $1,355.42. (Record p. 1142). 
C. The Standard of Review on Appeal as to All Issues. 
1. The Court reviews issues of law under the correction of error standard. David 
Winters v. JoAnne Schulman 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Patricia G. Smith v. 
Scott G. Smith 793 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). No deference is given. 
2. The Court reviews any findings of fact based upon disputed evidence under the 
clearly erroneous standard. Gary W. Jense v. Sara A. Jense 784 P.2d 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
3. The Court reviews the application of the law to a known set of facts under the 
correction of error standard. Hope H. Openshaw v. Richard C. Openshaw 639 P.2d 177 
(Utah 1981): Patricia G. Smith v. Scott Smith 793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990); Patricia Boals 
v. Jack M. Boals 664 P.2d 1191 (Utah 1983). 
4. The Court reviews the division of marital assets under the abuse of discretion 
standard. Anita Bushell v. Gene A. Bushell 649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982). 
5. The Court reviews the award or the denial of alimony to a spouse under the 
abuse of discretion standard. Michele Bell v. Harold Bell 810 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1991). 
6. The Court reviews the award or denial of attorney's fees under the abuse of 
discretion standard. Douglas Crouse v. Audrey Crouse 817 P.2d 836 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
7. The final judgment of the Trial Court will not stand when it is not supported 
by the evidence. Carl B. Weise v. Christine M. Wiese 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985). 
8. Failure to enter specific findings of fact on a critical issue is evidence of abuse 
of discretion. Eva L. Jeffries v. Donald L.Jeffries 752 P.2d 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
IV. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Statutory Provisions: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
UCA §15-1-1 
UCA §30-3-3 
UCA §30-3-5 
UCA §30-3-10.6 
UCA §30-3-10.17 
UCA §34-23-201 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
UCA §34-23-205 
UCA §34-23-206 
UCA §59-7-505 
UCA §59-10-502 
UCA §59-10-504 
UCA §78-32-3 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASES 
A. The Nature of the Cases Subject to Appeal. 
This was a divorce action and custody dispute. The Court entered a Decree of 
Divorce on November 8th, 1999 after conducting a two (2) day Bench Trial on August 19th 
and 20th, 1999. The issue of physical custody of the minor children is not on appeal. 
I O
13. UCA §78-32-9 
14. UCA §78-45-7 
15. UCA §78-45-7.5 
16. UCA §78-45-7.14 
17. UCA §78-45-7.21 
18. UCA §78-45-7.22 
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This is also an appeal of a contempt matter originating through a series of Order to 
Show Cause proceedings seeking to enforce various portions of the Decree of Divorce 
regarding visitation matters beginning on Halloween 1999 and through Christmas 1999. 
B. The Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below as to Contempt Matters. 
A charge of contempt was brought by the Respondent (husband) immediately after 
the Decree of Divorce was entered but before the District Court ruled on the Petitioner's 
motion for a new trial. (Record pp. 1187 - 1189 and 1309 -1310). The trial judge ruled on 
both the contempt matter and the Petitioner's motion for a new trial on February 25th, 2000. 
The Court denied the Petitioner's motion to amend the decree of divorce. (Contempt Trial 
p. 23; Record pp. 1309 to 1310). The District Court then considered the charge of contempt. 
The Petitioner raised various procedural objections to the contempt matter which were 
overruled. (Contempt Trial, pp. 50 to 54; Record pp. 1139 to 1148). The Court then 
conducted a one-half (Vi) day bench trial and issued a citation of contempt and ordered the 
Petitioner to pay attorney's fees of $350.00. (Record pp. 1256 and 1264). 
C. The Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below as to the Divorce Action. 
The parties physically separated in early 1995. Shortly before the patrties separated, 
Mr. Miller created the first in a series of trusts and began to put the assets of the marriage 
into it and (at a later date) into other trusts. (Divorce Trial p. 268). The fraudulent transfer 
issues were essentially resolved when the Court ruled that it would treat all assets held by 
third parties as marital assets. (Divorce Trial pp. 259,261 to 263; Contempt Trial pp. 20 and 
23). 
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The Petitioner filed a motion to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law on 
the 15th day of November, 1999. (Record pp. 1139 to 1148). The motion was denied. 
(Record pp. 1309 to 1310). 
D. Statement of the Core Facts as to Contempt and the Sanctions Entered. 
1. The parties separated in 1995. The Appellant (i.e. the wife) has continued to 
reside in the marital residence in Riverton, Utah. (Contempt Trial pp. 20 to 21). 
2. The Divorce Decree awarded split custody of the minor children. The father 
was awarded physical custody of the two (2) older boys, Jeron and Brady. The mother was 
awarded physical custody of the daughter, Stephanie. The daughter was eight (8) years of 
age at the time of the trial. (Decree of Divorce ^[2 and 3; Record pp. 1122 to 1131; 
Addendum No. 4, p. 34). Child support was ordered based on split custody. 
3. The Respondent has a history of domestic violence directed towards the 
Petitioner. This can occur when children are present. (Contempt Trial pp. 60 to 66). 
4. Stephanie was in counseling concerning matters involving her father including 
the episode of violence in October of 1999. (Contempt Trial pp. 60 to 66). 
5. The father continues to display violence and anger towards the mother in the 
presence of the daughter which creates emotional conflict for the child and necessarily 
involves the child in the matter because she is an eye witness to the violence and the 
animosity. (Contempt Trial pp. 60 to 66). 
6. The first Order to Show Cause was issued just ten (10) days after the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce on November 8,1999, and within a few days of the Petitioner's filing 
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of her Motion for a new trial or an amended Decree of Divorce. (Record pp. 1172 to 1181). 
7. The first Order to Show Cause was dated November 18, 1999. (Record p.. 
1172; Addendum No. 6, p. 58). The motion in support of the raised the following legal and 
factual matters: 
A. The return of Stephanie's computer to the home of the 
Respondent. 
B. A claim of contempt over a claim that the wife involved her son, 
Brady, in removing Stephanie's computer from the 
Respondent's home. [There was no evidence presented by the 
Respondent at trial on the claim that the wife "involved" the 
child.] 
C. A claim of contempt for "taking" Stephanie from the father who 
was visiting with the child during a hockey game on November 
20, 1999. 
D. Restraining the Petitioner from coming on or about the property 
of the Respondent and his mother (i.e. the children's 
grandmother), except to drop off the children and not to exit the 
vehicle when she arrives. 
E. Retraining the Petitioner from approaching the children or 
inviting them to "abandon" the father. 
F. Awarding the Respondent compulsory overnight visitation with 
Stephanie for Halloween 2000 for not allowing any visitation for 
Halloween 1999. (See Contempt Trial p. 48). 
G. For a money judgment for $350.00 to be paid as a result for the 
necessity of bringing the Order to Show Cause action. 
8. The Order to Show Cause was then "mailed" to the Petitioner. It was not 
personally served upon her by a process server or constable. (Record p. 1187 to 1189). 
9. The first Order to Show Cause was supported by a legal Memorandum dated 
November 18th, 1999. (Record p. 1151 to 1171). 
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10. No supporting affidavit was filed describing the specific acts complained of 
or even identifying those portions of the Decree of Divorce or other Order that was violated. 
11. The District Court then entered a written Order regarding the first Order to 
Show Cause on the 22nd day of December, 1999. (Record p. 1218 to 1220). 
12. The provisions of the Decree of Divorce that are relevant to the issues of 
contempt (but not the Halloween episode) include the following: 
A. Petitioner ("Tracy") is hereby awarded a decree of divorce from 
the respondent ("Larry") on grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. (Divorce Decree Tfl); (Record pp.1122 to 1131; 
Addendum No. 4, p.34). 
B. The parties are awarded joint legal custody of their minor 
children, Jeron L. Miller, born December 1, 1983, Brady L. 
Miller, born June 25, 1985, and Stephanie Miller, born July 10, 
1991. Primary physical custody of Jeron and Brady shall be 
with Larry, and primary physical custody of Stephanie shall be 
with Tracy. (Divorce Decree <P). (Emphasis added). 
C. Each parent shall be entitled to exercise visitation with the 
children as the parties and the children are able to agree, but no 
event less frequently than as set forth at §30-3-35, Utah Code 
Ann. The children are to be given leeway to determine the 
mount of time they spend with either parent, and with which 
parent they reside, and the parties are to respect the children's 
desires. (Divorce Decree ^3). (Emphasis Added). 
D. Joint legal custody, as used herein, shall mean the sharing of 
rights, duties, and responsibilities as parents by both parties. 
Each parent shall have the authority to make routine decisions 
regarding the children's day-to-day activities, but each shall be 
required to consult with the other and seek his or her opinion on 
all non-routine matters, such as medical and educational 
decisions involving the children. (Divorce Decree ^|4). 
(Emphasis added). 
-9-
E. The parties shall notify the other whenever he or she intends to 
take the children on any over night trip exceeding two nights, 
and provide the other with a travel itinerary with addresses and 
telephone numbers where he or she may be reached in the event 
of an emergency. (Divorce Decree TJ12). (Emphasis added). 
13. The Respondent, on December 28 th, 1999, filed for a second Order to Show 
Cause seeking to again hold the Petitioner in contempt of court. (Record p. 1238 to 1240). 
14. The District Court, on January 5th, 2000, then issued the second Order to Show 
Cause and the same was again "mailed" to the Petitioner and was not personally served upon 
her by the sheriff or constable. (Record pp. 1238 to 1240). (Addendum No. 7, p.61). 
15. The second Order to Show Cause sought the following relief from the court: 
A. For a citation of contempl for "coming to" the Respondent's 
property on Monday, December 20, 1999, in violation of the 
order authorized to be entered on December 7,1999. [This never 
occurred.] (Contempt Trial pp. 77 to 79). 
B. For a citation of contempt for taking the children from the 
Respondent's custody on Monday December 20, 1999, in 
violation of the order authorized to be entered on December 7, 
1999. [This never occurred.] (Contempt Trial p. 79). 
C. For a citation of contempt for removing the two (2) boys from 
school on December 21st and 22nd, 1999, supposedly without his 
consent. (Contempt Trial p. 78). 
D. For a citation of contempt for denying all visitation with 
Stephanie since December 7, 1999. [No proof was offered 
during the trial on this issue.] (Contempt Trial pp. 155 to 156). 
E. Certifying for trial the contempt issues originally raised in the 
December 7, 1999, hearing on the first Order to Show Cause. 
F. For additional attorney's fees of $350.00 for bringing the second 
Order to Show Cause action. 
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16. Respondent filed a verified "Memorandum" in support of the second Order to 
Show Cause, but again no fact specific Affidavit was filed. (Record pp. 1221 to 1226). 
17. The Respondent nonetheless allowed the boys to travel to Arizona for a family 
Christmas visit with the ill and elderly maternal grandparents. (Contempt Trial pp. 77 to 83). 
18. There was no evidence presented during the trial that the Petitioner was forcing 
any person to act against their own will. To the contrary, she was encouraging visitation 
despite the prior acts of violence. (Contempt Trial p. 59). 
19. The Respondent did not testify during the trial regarding any of the acts 
complained of or identify which visitation orders were violated. (Contempt Trial pp. 155 to 
159). 
E. Statement of the Core Facts as to Divorce Action. 
1. The parties were married for 18 years. This was a long marriage with three (3) 
minor children born of the relationship. (Record p. 1109, Findings of Fact %l to 4). 
2. The Plaintiff is a hair dresser. The Defendant is a contractor and is the owner 
or operator of several businesses or trusts engaged in heavy equipment operation and 
construction. (Divorce Trial pp. 189 to 196). 
3. The Respondent was awarded all of his businesses, his business interest, and 
all income producing assets of the marriage and all significant income producing premarital 
real estate. This award of real property included the commercially zoned property on State 
Street that was acquired during the marriage. (Record pp. 1122 to 1131). 
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4. The Petitioner was awarded her home and her hair salon equipment which the 
Respondent had in his possession for four (4) years. (Divorce Trial pp. 60 to 61). 
5. During the trial, the Respondent never provided current or historical financial 
information to the District Court of the type which is necessary in order to fix his child 
support obligations and his alimony obligations. (Divorce Trial pp. 231 to 232). 
6. The Respondent failed to provide to the District Court verified evidence (or 
even verifiable evidence) of his actual income and financial resources on a current and 
historical basis including the four (4) calendar years during which the case was pending in 
the court. (Divorce Trial p. 253). 
7. The Respondent has not filed a state or federal personal income tax return since 
1989. (Divorce Trial pp.231 and, 256 to 257). 
8. Limited financial information for the business for the period of time between 
January, 1999 to August, 1999 was provided on the day of the trial. (Respondent's Trial 
Exhibit 63; Addendum No. 40, p. 376). This financial information consisted of a net profit 
computation for LTM, Inc. No other current and historical personal, business, estate, or trust 
information was provided to the District Court. The only exceptions were for two (2) 
corporate income tax returns (Forms 1120) which show substantial "rents" being paid to the 
Trusts and third parties. (Petitioner's Trial Exhibits 35 and 36; Addendum No. 24 and 25). 
These corporate tax returns showed rents of $44,814.00 being paid to third parties for the 
year 1995 and rents of $82,194.00 being paid for the year 1996. 
9. The Respondent had the benefit of considerable amounts of financial assets: 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
h 
6 
7 
8 
9 
A DESCRIPTION OF 
THE FINANCIAL ITEM 
Summary of business checks 
paid to Jay Woodall, Esq. 
Summary of Deposits into the 
LTM, Inc. Account (i.e. his 
personal bank account) 
Summary of Payments Made to 
Trustees and Various Attorneys 
Summary of Cash Withdrawals 
of Larry Miller from LTM, Inc. 
(i.e. the corporate bank account) 
Summary of Cash Withdrawals 
from Construction and 
Equipment Account of Larry 
Miller (i.e. his personal account) 
(different bank account) 
Bank Statements of LTM 
Construction and Equipment 
Account (i.e. his personal 
account) 
Payments to Theron Miller Trust 
by LTM, Inc. (out of the 
corporate account) 
1995 Form 1120-A tax return 
for LTM, Inc. - Rents paid of 
$44,814.00. 
1996 Form 1120-A tax return 
for LTM, Inc. - Rents paid of 
$82,194.00. 
TRIAL 
EXHIBIT 
NO 
37 
38 
49 
50 
51 
52 
54 
35 
36 
TOTAL 
AMOUNT OF 
MONEY 
INVOLVED 
$5,060.00 
$64,880.00 
$35,567.47 
$46,914.75 
$22,998.25 
$33,574.09 
$21,122.00 
$44,814.00 
$82,194.00 
$357,124.56 
DIVORCE 
TRIAL 
TRANSCRIPT 
PAGES 
270 to 271 
and 275 
288 to 291 
273 to 276 
277 to 281 
280 to 281 
281 to 289 
9 
266 to 267 
268 
TIME PERIOD 1 
COVERED 
Nov 95 to 
Dec 96 
Feb 93 to 
Jan 95 
Feb 95 to 
Feb 97 
Jan 95 to 
Dec 95 
Jan 94 to 
Aug 95 
Apr 1,94 
to 
Dec 1,94 
1997 to 1 
1998 
1995 I 
1996 I 
10. The business debts were modest and was at least limited to only three (3) 
assets. (Divorce Trial pp. 251 to 252). This includes "leased" assets. 
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11. The court awarded the largest portion of the marital assets, in terms of number 
and value, to the Respondent. (Record pp. 1122 to 1131; Trial Exhibit 62; Addendum No. 
39). 
12. At the conclusion of the trial the District Court then vacated the temporary 
support orders in favor to the wife and did not reduce them to a judgment. The Respondent 
was ordered to pay temporary spousal support of $400.00 per month. (Record p. 1129,1f30). 
No temporary alimony payments were made to the wife because the husband could not afford 
to pay it. (Divorce Trial p. 276; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 46; Addendum No.31, p. 209). 
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT AS TO CONTEMPT MATTERS 
A. Personal jurisdiction over the Petitioner is lacking in the case and each Order 
to Show Cause should have been dismissed for lack of personal services as required by law. 
B. The complaining party (as to each Order to Show Cause) failed to file the 
required Affidavit based upon first hand knowledge setting forth the specific acts that 
constitute a violation of an identified order of the court. UCA §78-32-3. 
C. The Decree of Divorce as prepared by the Respondent's counsel and entered 
by the District Court cannot be a basis of contempt as a matter of law. A prima facie case 
of contempt has not been shown to exist upon the face of the pleadings or in the record. 
D. The Court failed to require the Respondent to first present a prima facia case 
of contempt before the Petitioner should have had to defend any specific charges. 
E. The complaining party has wholly failed to comply with the controlling 
provisions of the Utah Code §78-32-1 et. seq. regarding contempt and thus the Court's 
-14-
procedure used to hold her in contempt deprived the Petitioner of due process of law. 
F. The nominal Defendant is entitled to recover her attorney's fees in defending 
the contempt action. The award of fees are authorized in this case by UCA §30-3-3. 
G. The Petitioner was denied due process of law in the imposition of the contempt 
citation and related sanctions and judgments. 
VII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT AS TO DIVORCE ACTION 
A. The Trial Court failed to properly apply the Adverse inference rule. 
B. The Trial Court failed to take into account in setting child support and alimony 
the income of the Respondent and his available personal and business financial resources. 
C. The Trial Court failed to require the Respondent to provide verifiable evidence 
of his income on an annualized basis or to properly excuse the same. 
D. The Trial Court should have awarded the tax exemptions for the minor children 
to the Petitioner on a permanent basis and committed error when it did not. 
E. The Trial Court improperly vacated the Petitioner temporary spousal support, 
failed to reduce the amount to a judgment and failed to award permanent alimony. 
F. The Trial Court failed to fairly divide the marital assets. 
G. The Trial Court failed to award the claimed court costs to the Petitioner. 
H. The Trial Court failed to award adequate attorney' s fee in light of the difficulty 
of the case. 
I. The Decree of Divorce lacked specific personal information required by law 
to be included in the order. 
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VIII. ARGUMENT AS TO CONTEMPT 
The District Court Must Have Jurisdiction 
Over the Party and Subject Matter Before 
Contempt Can be Imposed. 
The court cannot impose a contempt sanction until it has first obtained personal 
jurisdiction over the party and the court has established its subject matter jurisdiction. USA 
v. Larry Dickinson 465 F.2d 496 (CA-5 1972); Bernard Olcott v. Delaware Flood Co. 76 
F.3d 1538 (CA-10 1996). See Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as to subject 
matter jurisdiction and the required dismissal. These are the two (2) preliminary matters that 
must be satisfied before the court can proceed to adjudicate any contempt matters against an 
individual. The moving party has the burden of proof on these two (2) critical issues. James 
Robinson v. City Court for the City of Ogden 185 P.2d 256 (Utah 1947). 
In this case, the District Court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction because the 
proper initiating pleadings were not filed by the Respondent. By state statute, the initial 
pleading must include an affidavit of the complaining witness. UCA §78-32-3. 
Once a Person is Subject to the Personal Jurisdiction 
of the Court in a Particular Matter, then Subsequent Pleadings 
Can be Mailed Pursuant to Rule 5(b). 
Personal jurisdiction over the Petitioner is lacking because there has been no personal 
service of legal process in the case. (Record pp. 1172 to 1181, and 1238 to 1240). The 
general rule of law is that once a court has acquired personal jurisdiction over a party in a 
specific action, it retains its jurisdiction over that specific matter until the case is finally 
concluded. It does not acquire jurisdiction over later matters or independent matters. 
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Rule 5(a) generally requires that all orders and pleadings subsequent to the complaint 
(or other pleading invoking the Court's jurisdiction) shall be served upon a party. Rule 5(b) 
further provides that where a party (or other person who is already subject to the personal 
jurisdiction of the Court) is required to serve process, then service of the process on that 
person's attorney of record is sufficient if accomplished by means of regular mail. The rule 
further states that service by mail is complete upon mailing of the same. Notice given to any 
attorney of record is notice upon the person hiring the attorney. Harriet W. Blake v. Earnest 
E. Blake 17 Ut.2d 369, 412 P.2d 454 (Utah 1966). 
These are the rules of law for the service of legal process. However, the District Court 
failed to recognize that contempt is a new or independent matter. 
The Order to Show Cause was Not Personally 
Served in the Manner Required by 
Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules. 
Each Order to Show Cause was initiated by the filing of a motion seeking the order. 
(Record pp. 1174 and 1227). Rule 6(d) provides that the motion and the supporting affidavit 
must be served together. This was not done in either case. The supposed sworn testimony 
for each order was provided after the fact and lacked the proper content of an affidavit. 
(Record pp. 1218 and 1357). This violated the statute and prescribed procedure. 
Due Process Requires a Person to 
be Advised of the Charges of Contempt 
Before There Can be Any Form of Punishment. 
If the contempt is not committed in the presence of the court, then UCA §78-32-3 
requires that an affidavit be filed describing the acts complained of which constitute the 
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contempt. James Robinson v. City Court for the City of Ogden 185 P.2d 256 (Utah 1947). 
The purpose of this statute is three-fold. First, it is intended to inform the person of the 
specific charges. Second, to inform the court of the claim of contempt. Tommie M. Brown 
v. Ronald G. Cook 123 Ut. 505,260 P.2d 544 (Utah 1953); In Re: Schulder 62 Ut. 591, 221 
P. 565 (Utah 1923): James Robinson v. City Court for the City of Qgden 185 P.2d 256 (Utah 
1947). Third, it ensures that the acts complained of did in fact occur as alleged by the 
complaining party. If the acts did not occur as alleged, then there is no legal basis for 
contempt, no reason for a trial and no obligation to defend the charge. This has been the lav/ 
in the state of Utah since 1880. Young v. Cannon 2 Utah 560 (1880). 
Utah law treats a civil contempt proceeding as a new or an independent proceeding 
apart from the underlying case. Therefore, some form of personal service on the 
contemptuous party is necessary in order to initiate this independent action. J.W. Jones v, 
LeRov H. Cox 84 Ut. 568, 37 P.2d 777 (Utah 1934); Utah Power and Light v. Richmond 
Irrigation Comp. 80 Utah 105, 13 P.2d 320 (Utah 1932); Maureen Burgers v. William 
Maiben 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982). All original pleadings commencing an "action" must 
be personally served upon the nominal Defendant. 
In any contempt proceeding, the Utah Supreme Court has declared that the affidavit 
takes the place of a "complaint" and until the pleading has been properly served upon the 
nominal Defendant, the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. J.W. Jones v. 
LeRov H. Cox 84 Ut. 568, 37 P.2d 777 (Utah 1934); James Robinson v. City Court for the 
Citv of Qgden 185 P.2d 256 (Utah 1947) (holding that the affidavit is the functional 
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equivalent of the Complaint). In Utah, a contempt charge is a separate proceeding and is 
apart from the principal action and in order for the citing court to acquire jurisdiction over 
the person, it is necessary that an affidavit or other initiating pleading be filed and then 
personally served upon the nominal Defendant. Maureen Burgers v. William Maiben 652 
P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); James Robinson v. City Court for the City of Qgden 185 P.2d 256 
(Utah 1947) (noting that an Affidavit is necessary in order to obtain jurisdiction over the 
person and if not done, then the ruling of the court is null and void); UCA §78-32-3; Rule 
4(e) the Rules. 
The next thing the Trial Court must do is identify in the pleadings where the 
complaining party has set forth (under oath) specific facts which constitutes the contempt. 
The pleadings must also identify with particularity the order (or part thereof) that is violated. 
The court must determine (in cases dealing with contempt) that the person so charged 
was properly served with specific notice of the contempt charges and notice the underlying 
facts that support the same. International Union United Mine Workers of America v. John 
L.Bagwell 512 US 821, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994). 
The party asserting contempt of court must make and file of record a detailed affidavit 
setting forth the specific charges under oath. Herald-Republican Publishing Co. v. Lewis 42 
Ut. 188, 129 P. 624 (Utah 1912); James Robinson v. City Court for the City of Qgden 185 
P.2d 256 (Utah 1947). The acts as stated in the Affidavit must make out a prima facie case 
of contempt. More importantly, on the face of the affidavit, it must be clear that the 
allegations are based upon admissible first hand evidence. The affidavit must be fact 
-19-
intensive and not merely conclusionary statements of the witness. Gunnison Irrigation 
Comp. v.Peterson 74 Utah 460,280 P.715 (Utah 1929). The specific affidavit must then be 
served upon the nominal Defendant at the same time the motion seeking contempt is served.. 
See Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 7 requires that a specific motion 
be filed with the court in writing in order to obtain an Order to Show Cause. Rule 7(b)(1) 
and (3). 
The state and federal courts have made it clear that the persons constitutional rights 
are to be strictly observed in a contempt proceeding. In Re: Oliver 333 US 257, 68 S.Ct. 
499, 92 L.Ed 682 (1948); Cooke v. USA 267 US 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed 767 (1925); 
John G. Powers v. Marvin S. Taylor 14 Ut.2d 118, 378 P.2d 519 (Utah 1963); Maureen 
Burgers v. William Maiben 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982). 
Service of the Order to Show Cause must be made personally. An exception may be 
made when the party is hiding from or evading personal service. When this occurs then 
service can then be made upon the attorney of record for the obstructing party. Bruno 
D'Aston v. Dorothy D'Aston 790 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1990) (personal service on the 
attorney of record was valid for an Order to Show Cause as to a claim of contempt where the 
party was evading personal service). (See the attached return of service from case showing 
Dorothy D'Aston was evading service of legal process.) (See Record at p. 1290). In this 
case, there is no evidence in the record that Mrs. Miller was evading service of process. 
Rule 4-102(2)(A) of the Code of Judicial Administration provides that an Order to 
Show Cause shall be "served" (not mailed) at least five (5) days prior to any scheduled 
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hearing on the issues raised in the motion. The rule further provides that the "return of 
service" on the Order to Show Cause (not a mailing certificate) must be filed with the Clerk 
of the Court at least two (2) days prior to the scheduled hearing. Rule 4-102(2)(B). This 
procedural rule does not reference the use of a mailing certificate as an alternative means of 
personally serving the nominal Defendant with required pleadings. 
A conviction of contempt (including any sanctions) will be reversed or vacated if it 
is obtained in part as the result of procedural irregularities. State of Utah v. Arden M. 
Barlow 771 P.2d 662 (Utah App. 1989); James Robinson v. City Court for the City of Ogden 
185 P.2d 256 (Utah 1947). 
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that any defense that is not 
required to be included in a responsive pleading can be raised at the time of trial. These 
defenses include lack of jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter of the proceeding. 
The Petitioner was deprived of due process of law on account of the Respondent's failure to 
follow affirmative procedural law in this case. 
The Issue of Contempt and Sanctions 
Cannot be Determined in the Absence of a 
Meaningful Evidentiary Hearing on the Merits. 
It is universally held that the party accused of contempt is entitled to a evidentiary 
hearing on the asserted charge. Stacie R. Stallings Smith v. Robert Smith 839 P.2d 685 
(Okla. App. 1992). The evidentiary hearing must proceed the imposition of any sanction or 
money judgment. 
The text of UCA §78-32-9 reads as follows: 
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When the person arrested has been brought up or has appeared the court or 
judge must proceed to investigate the charge, and must hear any answer which 
the person arrested may make to the same, and may examine witnesses for or 
against him; for which an adjournment may be had from time to time, if 
necessary. (Emphasis added.) 
Before a person can be found in contempt, he must be given a hearing on the facts of 
the case in order to afford the party "due process" of law. Maureen Burgers v. William 
Maiben 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982). This includes the right to have an attorney assist in the 
case, the right to confront the accusers, the right to be advised of the charges being made, and 
the right to offer testimony in defense of the specific charges. James Robinson v. City Court 
for the City of Ogden 185 P.2d 256 (Utah 1947). No sanction, judgment, or other penalty 
can be imposed prior to the hearing. 
The party claiming the existence of contempt must put on his case first and at the very 
least establish a prima facia case before a response is required. This did not occur in this 
case. (Contempt Trial pp. 54 - 56). The Respondent was not required to show how the 
Halloween visitation was an act of contempt, how the computer incident was an act of 
contempt, or how the hockey incident was an act of contempt or how the Christmas visit to 
the grandparents living in Arizona was an act of contempt or how Tracy Miller was 
personally involved. 
There are Two (2) Primary Elements of 
Civil Contempt Under Utah Law. 
In order for a person to be guilty of a civil contempt charge, there must be: (1) an 
underlying specific order of the court which is lawful, and (2) the party's actual conduct in 
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violating the order must constitute contempt directed towards the power or the authority of 
the court. These are the two (2) primary and central issues involving contempt of court under 
both state and federal law. USA v. State of Connecticut 931 F.Supp 974 (DC Conn. 1996); 
Pearl C. Foreman v. Otto C. Foreman 111 Ut. 72, 176 P.2d 144 (Utah 1946); 17 Am.Jur.2d 
Contempt §1. 
A mere violation of an order or decree of the court is not ipso facto contempt. There 
must be shown that the conduct complained about that includes an element of disdain for the 
power or the authority of the court. USA v. Gregory Robinson 922 F.2d 1531 (CA-11 1991); 
Household Bank v. Ross 148 Misc.2d 841, 562 NYS.2d 373 (1990) (no intent to impair or 
impede the order of the court); Harriette Williams Downey v. Michael A. Clauder 30 F.3d 
681 (CA-6 1994) (lack of spite towards the court and good faith attempt to comply); Douglas 
Prior v. State of Florida 562 So.2d 864 (Fla. App. 1990) (conduct did not display any disdain 
for the court's authority). There must be present in the facts (expressly or by reasonable 
implication) an intent to affront the authority of the court by the specific conduct complained 
of. USA v. Keith Engstrom 16 F.3d 1006 (CA-9 1994); William Pounders v. Penelope 
Watson 521 US 982, 138 L.Ed.2d 976, 117 S.Ct. 2359 (1997) (advocacy which is fearless, 
vigorous, and effective, but which is not disruptive conduct is not contempt) Waste 
Conversion v. Rollins Environmental Services 893 F.2d 605 (CA-3 1990) (conduct not 
defiant of or to the court is not contempt); 17 Am.Jur.2d Contempt §1, §2, and §36. 
The proof at trial of the basic elements of conduct and the specific intent to affront the 
court's authority remains with the moving party. In the case at hand, there is no evidence 
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before the court that makes out a prima facie case of contempt. As a factual matter, there 
was no proven violation of any order of the District Court as to Halloween, the hockey game, 
the removal of the computer and the Arizona Christmas visitation. 
A Citation of Contempt Will Not Stand Unless 
There is a Clear, Specific, and Unambiguous Order 
and Which is Set Forth in Writing. 
To support a claim of contempt, the order complained of must be specific, clear, and 
unambiguous so that the person charged with disobedience to the order must know of his 
duties and obligations and then chooses to act in contravention of the same. 17 Am.Jur.2d 
Contempt §131. As a rule, the order must be in writing so as to make sure the party knew 
of and understood the order. 17 Am.Jur.2d Contempt §131. An oral order must be such that 
the party knew of its contempt consequences before the conduct was engaged in. In Re: 
Edward Camara 628 SW.2d 803 (Tex. Crim. 1982); Henry G. Spallone v. USA 493 US 265, 
107 L.Ed.2d 644, 110 S.Ct. 625 (1990). 
In this case, there was no evidence presented during the contempt trial by the 
Respondent regarding the 1999 Halloween visitation which showed what order was in fact 
violated by the Petitioner's specific conduct. (Contempt Trial pp. 155 to 157). 
In this case, the Decree of Divorce does not contain language which is clear and 
specific and which has been proven by clear and convincing evidence to have been violated 
by the wife. The controlling provisions of the Decree of Divorce reads as follows: 
1. The parties are awarded joint legal custody of their minor children, 
Jeron L.Miller, born December 1,1983, Brady L.Miller, born June 25, 
1985, and Stephanie Miller, bom July 10, 1991. Primary physical 
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custody of Jeron and Brady shall be with Larry, and primary physical 
custody of Stephanie shall be with Tracy. (Divorce Decree [^2). 
(Emphasis added). 
2. Each parent shall be entitled to exercise visitation with the children as 
the parties and the children are able to agree, but no event less 
frequently than as set forth at §30-3-35, Utah Code Ann. The children 
are to be given leeway to determine the amount of time they spend with 
either parent, and with which parent they reside, and the parties are to 
respect the children's desires. (Divorce Decree ^3). (Emphasis 
Added). 
3. Joint legal custody, as used herein, shall mean the sharing of rights, 
duties, and responsibilities as parents by both parties. Each parent shall 
have the authority to make routine decisions regarding the children's 
day-to-day activities, but each shall be required to consult with the 
other and seek his or her opinion on all non-routine matters, such as 
medical and educational decisions involving the children. (Divorce 
Decree ^|4). (Emphasis added). 
4. The parties shall notify the other whenever he or she intends to take the 
children on any over night trip exceeding two nights, and provide the 
other with a travel itinerary with addresses and telephone numbers 
where he or she may be reached in the event of an emergency. 
(Divorce Decree ^fl2). (Emphasis added). 
As a matter of law, the acts complained of by the Respondent cannot amount to a 
violation of the Decree of Divorce based upon the above language, reservations, and rights 
of the individual children. 
Contempt Involves the Entering of Findings 
of Fact Relating to Three (3) Basic 
Aspects of the Order in Question. 
When a court considers a charge of contempt, it must: First, determine that the person 
knew of the court's order and that he understood the order. Second, it must be shown that 
the person had the ability to comply with the court's original order. Third, it must be shown 
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that the person willfully and knowingly refused to comply with the order. JuneM. Thomas 
v. Harry E. Thomas 569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977); Utah Farm Production Credit Assoc, v. 
Garth N. Labrum 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988); David Brown v. State of Florida 579 So.2d 
898 (Fla. App. 1991); USA v. Terry W. Hollowav 789 F.Supp 957 (DC ND Ind. 1992); IQ 
Re: Hoover 44 Utah 476 (Utah 1920). 
No contempt of court can occur when the order allegedly violated is void or illegal. 
In Re: Roger's Estate 75 Ut. 290, 284 P. 992 (Utah 1930):Utah Farm Production Credit 
Assoc, v. Garth N. Labrum 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988); 17 Am.Jur.2d Contempt § 148. §149, 
and §150. Bowman Dairy Co. v. USA 341 US 214, 71 S.Ct. 675, 95 L.Ed 879 (1951). 
The findings of facts must be made on all of the elements of the claim or it is 
reversible error. State of Utah v. Don Bartholomew 85 Ut. 94, 38 P.2d 753 (Utah 1934). 
The findings of facts in the case do not address all of the elements of a contempt claim. 
(Record pp. 1322 to 1326). The findings wholly fail to address the defenses claimed. 
A person who puts forth every reasonable effort to comply with a court order is not 
guilty of contempt. Gwennavera T. Limb v. Edward T. Limb 113 Ut. 385, 195 P.2d 263 
(Utah 1948); Barbara L. Jeppson v. Charles B. Jeppson 597 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1979). 
The claim of contempt involves five (5) separate events. They are: (i) the father's 
claim to Halloween visitation for 1999, (ii) the removal of a computer from the father's 
home, (iii) Stephanie's decision to go home with her mother at the end of the hockey game 
in November of 1999, (iv) the taking of the children out of school for Christmas vacation in 
1999 to visit the elderly and ailing grandparents, and (v) the supposed refusal to allow any 
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visitation with Stephanie since December 7th, 1999 through December 24th 1999. The 
second Order to Show Cause was signed on December 24th, 1999 but not filed until 
December 28th, 1999. 
In this case, the trial evidence established the following: 
A. The minor child was in fear of her father due to the October 13th, 1999 rock 
throwing episode. (Contempt Trial pp. 61 to 67). 
B. The child chose to have Halloween with friends and her brother and not to go 
and visit her father despite the mother's specific encouragement to go. 
(Contempt Trial pp. 61 to 62, and 66 to 67). 
C. The father refuses to return the child to the mother even though the child 
wanted to go home. (Contempt Trial p. 69). 
D. The mother never entered the home or the yard but rather parked her vehicle 
on a side street on a public road and waited for the child. The child then 
bought out her own computer from the home. (Contempt Trial p. 72). 
E. The child personally removed the computer from the house. (Contempt Trial 
pp. 72 to 73). [NOTE: It would be a violation of the order for the mother to 
carry the computer back into the home.] 
F. The child wanted to go home immediately after the hockey game with her 
mother. (Contempt Trial p. 75 to 76; Addendum No. 4, }^3). 
G. The Christmas vacation was planned in September of 1999 and all of the 
children wanted to go. (Contempt Trial p. 79). 
H. The father had about seven (7) days of continuous Christmas vacation 
visitation with all three (3) children after they returned home from Arizona. 
(Contempt Trial pp. 80, 81 and 83). 
I. The father has refused at least two (2) visits with Stephanie due to work. 
(Contempt Trial pp. 84, 88 and 89). 
J. The father had visits on Saturday and Sunday in January 2000. (Contempt 
Trial pp. 86 to 88). 
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K. The father visited with child on Valentine's Day 2000 and also had weekend 
visitation. (Contempt Trial pp. 88). 
L. The father has periodically missed scheduled visitation for his own personal 
reasons. (Contempt Trial pp. 92 to 93). 
M. The trial evidence does not support a claim of contempt by clear and 
convincing evidence. The Respondent's only trial testimony consisted of 
reasons why he did not exercise his visitation. (Contempt Trial pp. 155 to 
157). 
The evidence taken as a whole and in a light most favorable to the Respondent does 
not prove contempt of a specific court order by clear and convincing evidence. 
The Custodial Parent Has Legal 
Custody Over the Person of the Minor Child. 
When a court awards physical custody of a child to a parent in a divorce action, the 
custodial parent has the final control over the physical child. This gives the custodial parent 
discretion in the matter. 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce & Separation §987. This legal power is not 
unfettered. However, the trial court is not to dictate how this discretion is exercised in a 
given situation. 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce & Separation §987. When the custodial parent is 
acting in good faith to protect the child, then the exercise of this custodial authority is not 
subject to a citation of contempt. 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce & Separation §997. 
It is acknowledged that if a parent has been cruel to his child, such may be grounds 
to deny visitation. 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce & Separation § 1000. There is no proof that Mrs. 
Miller denied any visitation at all. 
Mrs. Miller has custody of Stephanie. Mr Miller has custody of the two (2) boys. The 
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Decree of Divorce allows the terms of the visitation to be set by the children, not the parents. 
Contempt Will Not Stand Where 
There is Acquiescence to the 
Conduct by the Complaining Party. 
As a rule, a party's acquiescence to the conduct which otherwise may violate an order 
of the court will defeat any claim of contempt. 17 Am Jur 2d Contempt § 159. 
The father allowed the children to go to Arizona and allowed Stephanie to be with her 
brother for Halloween. There is no evidence presented during the trial that the children were 
taken by force or compelled to go to Arizona against their individual wishes. The Decree of 
Divorce recognizes that the children's desires must be taken into account by both parents. 
(Contempt Trial p. 77 to 83; Addendum No. 4, ^ }3). This alone is a complete defense to the 
claim. 
Stephanie informed her father of her desire to go home with her mother from the 
hockey game. (Contempt Trial pp. 75 to 76, and 108). This again is a complete defense. 
The children, as a group, enjoyed Christmas 1999 together in Arizona traveling by car 
beginning on Wednesday, December 22nd and returning by plane on Saturday, December 
25th . (Contempt Trial pp. 77 to 83). Mr. Miller was informed in advance of the holiday 
plans. (Contempt Trial pp. 109 to 114). The boys had permission from their father and had 
personally cleared their holiday plans with school officials. The Respondent changed his 
mind at the last minute in order to create a crisis. However, he nontheless allowed the boys 
to travel when confronted about the consequences of the last minute objection to the holiday 
visit. (Record p. 1293). (Letter to Mr. Miller's attorney over the objection.) 
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With respect to the computer incident, the evidence is clear that the Petitioner never 
entered the premises in violation of any order. (Contempt Trial pp. 72 to 74). When the 
Respondent asked that the computer be returned, the Petitioner folly cooperated. (Contempt 
Trial pp. 74 to 75). 
With respect to refusal to allow visitation, it is clear that the father had ongoing and 
significant visitation at all times both before and after the decree of divorce was entered. The 
father had all the children for a full week starting Christmas day (Contempt Trial pp. 801o 
83). This was about seven (7) continuous days and nights of visitation with all three (3) 
children. The father was having visitation the day he filed his motion claiming denial of 
visitation. 
The Respondent wholly failed to present any evidence during the trial as to what order 
was violated as far as Halloween 1999 was concerned. In addition, he failed to identify 
which visitation since December 7 th, 1999 was unjustifiably refused by the wife. 
IX. ARGUMENT AS TO THE MERITS OF THE DIVORCE ACTION 
The appropriateness of the Decree of Divorce depends (in large part) on the income 
and the earnings ability of each spouse. The Respondent admits that his historic personal 
earnings was at least $5,000 per month. (Divorce Trial p. 289). 
The Adverse Inference Rule 
is an Important Evidentiary Presumption that 
Applies in All Civil Judicial Proceedings. 
For over a century, there has existed in the law an evidentiary inference that can be 
drawn by the court or the fact finder in all civil cases to the effect that withheld evidence 
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would in fact be unfavorable where: (i) the evidence would be relevant to the case, (ii) the 
evidence would properly be part of the case, and (iii) the evidence is within the control of a 
party whose interest would naturally be to produce it. 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence §245; Harrief 
W. Lvon v. Hawkin Meleard 66 Ida. 599,163 P.2d 1019 (Ida. 1945); Bowe v. Palmer 36 Ut. 
214,102 P. 1007 (Utah 1909); British Columbia Breweries v. King County 17 Wash.2d 437. 
135 P.2d 870 (Wash. 1943); Wetmore v. Rvmer 169 US 115, 18 S.Ct. 293, 42 L.Ed 682 
(1898). 
If the party has control over the witness or the evidence, then the doctrine can and 
should be applied by the court. George W. McKay v. Commissioner 89-2 USTC1J9574,886 
F.2d 1237 (CA-9 1989); Wichita Terminal v. Commissioner 6 TCM 1158 (1940), aff d 47-1 
USTC 1J9253, 162 F.2d 513 (CA-10 1947). The fact finder is allowed to draw negative 
inferences against the party for its failure to produce a witness whose testimony would 
"elucidate" an important issue or fact in the case. Graves v. USA 150 US 118, 14 S.Ct. 40 
(1893); Tracy B. Streber v. Commissioner 98-2 USTC Tf50,333 (CA-5 1998). 
There is a companion rule of evidentiary law that provides that where a party has the 
means in his power of rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against him, then the 
failure to furnish the rebutting evidence gives rise to a strong presumption that he cannot do 
so. 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence §245; Mammoth Oil Company v. USA 275 US 13, 48 S.Ct. 1, 
72 L.Ed 137(1927). In addition, where a party offers weak or less than satisfactory evidence 
on an issue and when it is apparent that proof of a more direct and explicit character is within 
the power of the party to present to the Court, then it may still be presumed that the better 
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evidence if actually provided, would not be favorable. 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence §145: 
Interstate Circuit v. USA 306 US 208, 59 S.Ct. 467, 83 L.Ed 610 (1939). These are 
important rules of law in all civil cases and is the bedrock of litigation in the United States. 
The Respondent complains that this case has gone on too long. However, during the 
four (4) years the case was pending he was just too busy to provide to the court critical 
personal and business financial information on a current and historical basis. (Divorce Trial 
pp. 197 to 198, 231 and 256). This excuse is advanced despite the fact that construction 
industry is less active during the winter months. (Divorce Trial p. 196). 
The Adverse Inference Rule Applies 
to Evidence Contained in Books, 
Records, and Documents. 
The adverse inference rule applies not only to testimonial evidence, but evidence that 
would be contained in relevant books, records, and other written documents. 29 Am.Jur.2d 
Evidence §246. William Runkle v. Santiago Burnham 158 US 216, 14 S.Ct. 837, 38 L.Ed 
694 (1893); Hodgson v. John Deere Plow Co. 104 Kan. 237, 178 P. 607 (Kan. 1919). This 
has been the basic rule of law in the United Stated for well over 100 years. 
A party who has been placed on notice (or who is required by law) to produce certain 
or specific records at a trial, and there is a refusal or failure to do so, then it may be presumed 
that the failure was because the records would be adverse and would actually support the 
other party's claims or contentions. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence $246. Hay v. Peterson 6 Wyo. 
419, 45 P. 1073 (1896): Hanson v. Lessee of Eustace 43 US 653, 2 How 653, 11 L.Ed 416 
(1844). 
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In this case, the Petitioner claims that Mr. Miller earns at least $5,000 per month. 
(Trial Exhibit 38; Addendum No. 26; p. 167). This fact was conceded on at least a historical 
basis. (Divorce Trial p. 289). 
The negative inference in the case is very strong and compelling. The Respondent 
had available to him specific information and financial records which would establish and 
verify his income which he had earned during the pendency of this case. (Divorce Trial pp. 
196 to 198). The Respondent chose not to make the critical evidence available to the court 
even though it is admitted that income and profit and loss statements can be generated in just 
"five seconds". (Divorce Trial p. 308, line 2). What little evidence he did provide to the 
court was for a very short period of time (January 1999 to August 1999), and represents the 
separate income of his business corporation and not his personal income derived from all 
available sources. (Divorce Trial p. 198 to 199); (Respondent's Trial Exhibit 63; Addendum 
No. 40, p.376). Mr. Miller never provided current and historical personal financial 
information concerning his income for the four (4) years prior to the divorce. The Petitioner 
filed and produced her personal income tax returns. (Trial Exhibit 1 to 4). The Respondent 
did not provide any valid reason for not providing verifiable evidence regarding his personal 
income during the pendency of the matter. The reason given was that he was "too busy". 
(Divorce Trial p. 231). The real reason was the preservation of his business assets was his 
top priority. (Divorce Trial p. 280). To disclose the truth put his personal income and 
perhaps his business assets at risk. 
Mr. Miller is required by law to file personal and business income tax returns. 26 
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USC §6012(a)(1); UCA §59-10-502. The filing requirement also applies to Trusts and 
Corporations. 26 USC §6012(a)(2) (corporations); UCA §59-7-505; 26 USC §6012(a)(4) 
(trusts); UCA §59-10-502; and UCA §59-10-504. These are serious obligations that apply 
to all persons and legal entities. 
Mr. Miller refused to file personal tax returns in part because he had no intention of 
paying the taxes. (Divorce Trial pp. 225 and 287). His refusal to provide the relevant 
financial information confirms that if the returns were prepared and filed, then they would 
only corroborate the Petitioner's evidence as to earnings ability. Mr. Miller in a moment of 
real candor admits he objected to any alimony award in favor of his wife. (Divorce Trial pp. 
218 to 220, and 287 and 295). 
Mr. Miller chose not to file his state or federal personal and business income tax 
returns. If he had, then he would have had to account for the income and expenses identified 
in various important trial exhibits presented by the Petitioner. (See Trial Exhibits 37,38,49, 
50, 51, and 54; Addendum Nos. 26, 27, 34, 35, 36, and 38). Mr. Miller did not produce at 
trial any K-l's for any of the three (3) Trusts that he had created or a K-lfor the income 
generated by his father's estate. (Divorce Trial pp. 232 to 233). He failed to prepare and file 
the required income tax returns even though when he applied for and obtained a federal tax 
identification number for each entity, he was reminded in writing of this federal filing duty. 
(See Trial Exhibits 20, 22, and 23) (letter from Internal Revenue Service reminding the 
applicant to file fiduciary tax returns). (Addendum Nos. 14, 16, and 17). He has failed to 
rebut the actual evidence against him and failed to rebut the compelling presumption of the 
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existence of adverse evidence in his own possession. 
One of the major reasons for not filing any personal income tax returns is because he 
would have had to account for the following income, benefits or resources he had: 
A. LTM is entitled to a 15% mark-up on all subcontractor work performed. 
(Divorce Trial pp. 198 to 199, and 208). 
B. Payment of only $306.00 in lawyers fees in 1999 to G. Weston (the business 
lawyer) but at least $5,060.00 for divorce lawyer via business checks. (Trial 
Exhibit No. 37; Addendum No. 26, p. 167). 
C. The receipt of rental income from real property which is deposited into the 
trusts of $175.00 per month. (Divorce Trial p. 209). 
D. The fact that the telephone bill was being paid by the business. (Divorce Trial 
p. 221). 
E. The fact that the business actually pays the utilities the on the State Street 
property. (Divorce Trial p. 258). 
F. The trusts were really created for his own benefit. (Divorce Trial p. 259). 
G. The trusts reserve the sum of $6,000.00 per month for equipment replacement. 
(Divorce Trial p. 267). 
H. The direct payment of various personal expenses by the business. (Divorce 
Trial p. 266). 
L The receipt of at least $20,000.00 in personal loans taken from the business. 
(Divorce Trial p. 270 to 271). 
J. All of the payments made to J. Woodhall and Littlefield & Peterson which 
came from the business was for legal representation in the present divorce. 
(Divorce Trial pp. 275 to 276). 
K. The stated salary of Mr. Miller is only $500.00 per month. (Divorce Trial p. 
278). 
L. The existence of numerous checks made out to cash totaling $22,998.25. 
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(Divorce Trial p. 279; Trial Extiibit 51; Addendum No. 36. p. 333). 
M. The fact that Mr. Miller carries $500.00 in cash in his wallet at all times in the 
event of an emergency. (Divorce Trial p. 279). [Payment of Support is not m 
emergency.] 
N. The business account is, in fact, his personal account and all funds deposited 
into the account belong to him. (Divorce Trial pp. 281 and 289). 
O. When "pressured", he pays "rent" to his own mother despite no lease. 
(Divorce Trial p. 286). [Despite the existence of a court order he does not pay 
child support in full or any alimony whatsoever.] 
P. Rents are pulled out of business in order to pay for his personal living 
expenses. (Divorce Trial p. 289). 
Q. The income earned by the two (2) boys is used by the father for support of his 
household. (Divorce Trial p. 293). 
R. The practice of making large cash withdrawals from the business of at least 
$46,914.75. (Trial Exhibit 50; Addendum No. 35, p. 275). 
The rebutting evidence of the Respondent is wholly lacking in candor, completeness, 
or accuracy and fails to account for large sums of money that he has dominion and control 
over. The financial statements are not prepared in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles. 
The Child Support Guidelines are to 
be Used in Determining the Amount of 
Child Support in all Proceedings Including 
Temporary and Permanent Support Awards 
and Modifications of the Same. 
UCA §78-45-7.2(2) now provides that the child support guidelines shall be applied 
as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or 
permanent child support to be paid in any case. The presumption means thai the guidelines 
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are the presumed correct amount of support unless it is successfully rebutted. The 
Respondent's failure to provide current and historical income does no rebut the guidelines. 
The subsections of the controlling statute now reads as follows: 
(a) "The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable 
presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or 
permanent child support." 
(b) "The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations 
required by the guidelines and the award amounts resulting from the 
application of the guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted 
under the provisions of this section." 
UCA §78-45-7.2(3) now requires that a written finding or a specific finding on the 
record must be entered and made in order to support the conclusion that complying with the 
provisions of the guidelines would be ". . . unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest 
of the child. . .", in a particular case. The statute specifically reads as follows: 
"A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclusion 
that complying with a provision of the guidelines would be unjust, 
inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is 
sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case." 
UCA §78-45-7.14 provides that the base child support shall be computed with 
reference to the incomes of the parties and the number of children of the parties. The 
statutory table becomes the presumed proper "base support" to be awarded in any judicial or 
administrative order of support. 
UCA §78-45-7(2) provides that the support award can not be entered until both 
parents submit child support worksheets to the Court. The worksheets must have verified 
financial information attached to them or otherwise made part of the record in contested 
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divorce cases. See Appendix "G" of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
The trial court has made no findings of facts sufficient to deviate from the guidelines. 
(Record pp. 1108 - 1121). The court must set support at the level the worksheets require 
based on the income of the parties as shown 1o exist based upon the evidence. The clear 
evidence in this case was that just prior to the filing of the divorce action, the Respondent 
was depositing into his personal bank account at least $59000.00 per month. (Divorce Trial 
pp. 281 to 289). (See Petitioner's Trial Exhibits 38 and 52; Addendum Nos. 27 and 37). 
This is and was his established available income that remained unrebutted by any other 
personal financial information. This $5,000.00 monthly figure does not even include Mi*. 
Miller's real property rental income and does not include the corporate, estate, and trust 
financial resources that were utilized by him or for him. (See Trial Exhibits 24, 25, 26, 27, 
28, 28A). 
The Respondent's real estate historically generated income. 
1 
2 
3 
Description of the 
Real Property 
Rental Property at: 
3153 & 3173 South 
200 East 
SLC, UT 
(two buildings) 
1592 Major Street 
State Street 
commercial property 
Historic Income 
Amount 
$195.00 rear 
building 
$270.00 front 
building 
$450 per month 
Used as office and 
residence. 
Rate of 
Compensation 
rental 
income 
rental 
income 
none 
Asset 
Awarded 
to 
Husband 
Husband 
Husbaind 
Record 
or Trial 
Exhibit 
28 & 1 
28A 
25, 26, 1 
and 27 
The assets conveyed to the trusts were not supported by any legal consideration. 
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(Trial Exhibit No. 21; AddendumNo. 155p. 109; Divorce Trial p. 261). This was a simple 
shifting of income to a different legal entity as part of a full scale attempt to hide income and 
not account for its use or its whereabouts. The stated justification for this conduct was asset 
protection. But assets are not protected when it amounts to a fraudulent transfer. 
The Gross Income of the Parties 
is to be Verified with Specific Evidence 
and is to be Annualized. 
The amount of child support to be paid or provided in a case depends upon the income 
and the financial resources available to the parties. UCA §78-45-7.5(1). "Gross income" is 
a defined term that includes taxable income for state and federal income tax accounting 
purposes. UCA §78-45-7.5(4)(b). The term also includes other sources of income and assets 
that can be used to produce income or sold to provide support for the dependents. 
The parties are required to provide to the court at least the following minimum 
financial verification: 
A. Year-to-date stubs or an employer statement regarding personal income. 
B. Complete copies of the most recently filed state and federal income tax 
returns. 
C. Disclose all overtime and all unearned income sources and resources. 
D. Verification of Office of Employment Security of party's wages and income. 
Verification of the assets, earnings, and income is mandatory. UCA §78-45-7.5(5)(b). 
This verification must be attached to the child support worksheets or at least provided to the 
court at the time of the trial. If there is no verification or inadequate verification provided, 
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then the District Court must make specific findings of fact as to why the required verification 
cannot be supplied by the party. This did not occur in this case. The excuse of being "too 
busy" cannot be accepted where the evidence is that he keeps his internal business accounting 
records current on a weekly basis. (Divorce Trial pp. 197 to 199). 
Income is defined broadly. UCA §78-45-7.5(1 )(b). It includes such things as: (i) 
wages, (ii) salaries, (iii) commissions, (iv) royalties, (v) bonuses, (vi) rents, (vii) gifts from 
anyone, (viii) alimony from a prior marriage, (ix) annuities, (x) capital gains, (xi) social 
security benefits, (xii) worker's compensation, (xiii) unemployment benefits, (xiv) disability 
benefits, etc. The District Court failed to even reference these other income resources. 
Where a person is self-employed or operates a business, gross income includes the 
gross receipts of the business less its necessary operating expenses. UCA §78-45-7.5(4)(a). 
It further provides that only expenses necessary to allow the business to operate at a 
reasonable level may be deducted from gross income. In addition, gross income determined 
in this subsection may differ significantly from the amount of income determined for state 
and federal income tax accounting purposes. UCA §78-45-7.5(4)(b). 
UCA §78-45-7.5(8) provides that the child's own benefit and earnings is disregarded. 
This is to prevent diversion of income. 
The $1,000.00 promised grade improvement bonus and the $1,000.00 work bonuses 
actually paid to the two (2) minor children is proof of the income potential of Mr. Miller. 
(Divorce Trial pp. 179 and 293). (See Petitioner's Trial Exhibits 18 and 50; AddendumNos. 
13 and 35). The paid bonus money was not contemporaneously deposited into the children's 
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personal savings accounts. The money was actually used by Mr. Miller to acquire household 
furnishings. (Divorce Trial pp. 293 to 294). This was another personal financial benefit to 
Mr. Miller. It is interesting to note that W-2's Forms were not prepared for this "bonus" 
money. This is money Mr. Miller controlled and exercised exclusive dominion over. The 
Respondent was diverting funds to himself (via his children and trusts) while at the same 
time being substantially delinquent on his ongoing child support obligation and his complete 
failure to pay any alimony to his wife. (Divorce Trial p. 291). 
The court has not made any findings of fact which would excuse the Respondent from 
providing the required income verification or authorizing only limited verification. He must 
present specific proof of his personal and business income both currently and historically. 
In the absence of the affirmative evidence, the historic income and admissions must be used. 
His business income is also a factor the court must consider, but failed to adequately address 
in its findings of fact. Mr. Miller's income is in excess of $5,000.00 per month. 
Minor Children are Prohibited From Working 
in a Hazardous Occupation Without 
the Consent of the State. 
The Respondent is employed full time as a heavy construction equipment operator. 
(Divorce Trial p. 245). The boys are also employed in the business and have five (5) to 
seven (7) years of work experience. (Divorce Trial pp. 206 and 245 to 246). 
The minor children are by law barred from being employed in a hazardous job such 
as heavy equipment operation. UCA §34-23-201; UCA §34-23-205; and UCA §34-23-206. 
There was no proof offered by the Respondent that the Utah Department of Labor authorized 
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the two (2) boys to work in a hazardous occupation or industry. The boys have no driver's 
license, so they cannot drive trucks or equipment on the highways. On site work by heavy 
earth moving equipment is ultra hazardous. 
The income that the two (2) boys generate for the business remains under the 
exclusive control of the Respondent. This is in addition to the income generated by his use 
of subcontractors (Divorce Trial p. 208) and the hiring of summer employees to increase 
earnings. (Divorce Trial p. 196). The children's work in an extra bonus due to the cheap 
labor costs. 
The District Court Can Award and Allocate 
Between the Parties the Income Tax Exemptions 
for the Minor Children. 
UCA §78-45-7.21(1) provides that there is no presumption as to which parent should 
be awarded the tax exemptions for dependent children for state and federal income tax 
accounting purposes. UCA §78-45-7.21 (2) provides that in allocating the tax exemption that 
Court or agency must consider the following important factors: 
A. The relative contribution each parent makes towards the cost of raising each 
child. 
B. The tax benefit it may create for each parent. 
C. Any other factors the court deems appropriate. 
UCA §78-45-7.21 (3) provides that a Court or the administrative agency cannot award 
the tax exemption to a parent if the parent is not current on his or her support obligations. 
This allocation rule has priority over UCA §78-45-7.21(2). UCA §78-45-7.21(4) provides 
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that a Court cannot award an exemption to a parent unless the award will result in a tax 
benefit to that parent. 
The Court in awarding any tax exemption to the Respondent is clearly erroneous. The 
Respondent has never been current on his support obligations. All three (3) factors weigh 
in favor of awarding the state and federal tax exemption solely to the Petitioner. There is no 
proof (including historical proof for the past five (5) calendar years) that any tax exemptions 
would benefit the Respondent. He is not current on his base child support. (Trial Exhibit 
No.45; Divorce Decree TJ29; Addendum Nos. 4 and 30). This necessarily shifts the actual 
burden of supporting the minor children to the Respondent. The only evidence that the 
Respondent presented on this issue was Trial Exhibit 67, which (by its own text) assumes 
income of $2,500.00 per month. This evidence was objected to as being speculation but was 
over ruled by the Court. (Divorce Trial pp. 222 to 224; Addendum No. 42, p. 378). 
The court clearly errored by not awarding all of the tax exemptions to the Petitioner. 
The Court Must Make Certain Findings of Fact 
and Rulings when Setting Alimony. 
The court must consider the following facts or factors when fixing the amount of 
temporary and permanent spousal support: 
A. The financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse. 
B. The recipient's ability to earn and produce income. 
C. The ability of the other spouse to provide financial support. 
D. The length of the marriage. 
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Under the provisions of UCA §30-3-5(7)(c), the court must look to the standard of 
living existing at the time of the separation, but the court may use the standard of living as 
it existed at the time of the trial in special circumstances. The court can consider all relevant 
factors in setting alimony and should attempt to equalize the parties' standard of living. 
UCA §30-3-5(7)(d). The finding of fact are inadequate on this subject. 
The court should have awarded the Petitioner permanent alimony. This was a long 
marriage and the wife has helped manage and maintain the premarital real estate assets of the 
Respondent. (Divorce Trial pp. 47 to 51, and 63 to 69). She has also worked in the 
construction business for a number of years and has provided clerical work (Divorce Trial 
pp. 47 to 48). Mr. Miller has the ability to pay spousal support even under the evidence 
viewed the light most favorable to the Respondent. (Trial Exhibits 6 and 67; Addendum 
Nos. 12 and 42). The Respondent admits earning income of $2,500.00 per month but his 
living expenses (ignoring the fact that the business pays some of these expenses) is only 
$1,721.00. 
The Most Important Factors to be 
Considered in Awarding Alimony are 
Established in the Case Law. 
An award of alimony is intended to enable the recipient to maintain (as nearly as 
possible) the standard of living as he/she enjoyed during the course of the marriage. Helen 
Naranjo v. Jose L. Naranio 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting Linda M. Olson v. 
Kenneth C. Olson 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985)). Permanent alimony should be awarded in 
long term marriages in amounts commensurate with the parties' standard of living. Demar 
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D. Jones v. Harriet H. Jones 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985); Linda M. Olson v. Kenneth C. 
Olson 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985). The amount of alimony is thereafter adjusted based upon 
the ability of the recipient (usually the wife) to supply income for herself and the ability of 
the obligor (usually the husband) to pay. Wayne C. Paffel v. Jean K. Paffel 732 P.2d 96 
(Utah 1986); Joan Eames v. Emerson Eames 735 P.2d 395 (Utah App. 1987). 
Any failure of the Trial Court to weigh the criteria appropriately or any failure to 
make a specific finding as to the current and future ability of the parties to generate income 
is reversible error. David L. Canning v. Caleen S. Canning 744 P.2d 325 (Utah App. 1987); 
Debbie A. Lee v. Dennis V. Lee 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987). The Court of Appeals has 
ruled that the Trial Court erred by decreasing alimony where there had been a 29 year 
marriage and the wife had no demonstrated ability to earn income. Russell B. Rasband v. 
Carol T. Rasband 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988); Gav Anderson v. Glade C. Anderson 757 
P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1988). 
A spouse does not forfeit a right to alimony by conduct which entitles the other spouse 
to a Decree of Divorce. Schuster v. Schuster 88 Ut. 257, 53 P.2d 428 (Utah 1936); Janet M. 
English v. W. Daniel English 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977). 
An award of alimony is appropriate even when it appears that the payment would have 
to come out of the separate assets of the obligor. DonaR. Sampinos v. John S. Sampinos 750 
P.2d 615 (Utah App. 1988). 
The evidence in this case is clear that the Respondent retained physical possession 
over the wife's salon assets without justification and which adversely affected her ability to 
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earn current income. (Divorce Trial pp.60 to 61). This retention of the property went on for 
four (4) years. This was her only source of income. Mr. Miller acted out of spite and malice 
and with the intent to reduce her standard of living by impairing her earnings ability. The 
Respondent defended his conduct by claiming that she was simply "storing" the equipment 
at his place. (Divorce Trial pp. 298 - 299 and 302). 
The Petitioner's income for 1994 to 1998 as shown on her tax returns was as follows: 
Tax Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Adjusted 
Gross Income 
$4,213.00 
$6,988.00 
$9,089.00 
$8,766.00 
Federal Income 
Tax Form 
1040 
1040 
1040 
1040 
Petitioner's Trial 
Exhibit 
1 
2 
3 
4 
The Respondent has significant financial resources available to him including: 
A 
B 
C 
ID 
Description of the Asset or Income Source 
Wages and remuneration derived from LTM, 
Inc. 
Rental Income from the premarital real estate 
holdings. 
Equipment rental income. 13 separate pieces 
of income producing assets that can be 
employed in combination. 
Payment of personal expenses by the 
business, corporations, trusts, etc. 
Trial 
Exhibit 
38 
25 to 
28A 
62 
37 
Divorce 
Trial 
Transcript 
289 
209 
190 to 
196,289, 
233 
221 
Amount of 
Income 
$5,000.00 1 
per month 
various 
amounts 
Hourly rates 
of $45.00 to 
$100.00 
various 
amounts 
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E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
Description of the Asset or Income Source 
Income producing commercial real estate. 
State Street property used by the business. 
(The wife's Vi interest and was not "rented" 
from her over the past four (4) years.) 
Contractor's license. 
Income from at least three (3) Trusts (K-l's). 
Rents paid to the Children's trusts 
Paid personal living expenses, 
(i.e. vacations, medical, etc.) 
Traded business services. 
Trial 
Exhibit 
N/A 
Divorce 
Trial 
Transcript 
244 
189 to 
196,245 
254 
234 
258, 266, 
275, 279, 
and 289 
285 
Amount of 
Income 
non declared 
non provided 
various 
amounts 
various 
amounts 
various 
amounts | 
The Respondent has exclusive control over various income generating business assets. 
1 
2 
3 
1 4 
Description of the 
Business Asset 
Kawasaki loader 
1995 
1968Freightliner 
International 
Vehicle 
Load King Trailer 
Respondent's 
Declared 
Value of the 
Asset. 
$35,000.00 
$1,000.00 
not clear 
$25,000.00 
Income 
Ability 
Yes 
$100/hr 
Yes 
$55/hr 
Yes 
$45/hr 
Yes 
Subject 
to Debt 
No 
No 
No 
Lease 
Awarded 
to 
Husband 
Husband 
Husband 
Husband 
Record or 
Trial Exhibit 
No. 62 
pp.194 1 
tol95 
&247 
Exhibit 62 
pp. 190 & 
247 
Exhibit 62 
pp.190 & 
247 
Exhibit 62 
p. 191 
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5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Description of the 
Business Asset 
Frehauf70' 
1973 model 
1945 Skitzer 
Loader 
580CC 1978 
Link-Belt 1989 
2650-c(2) 
Tilt Deck Trailer 
1971 model 
Orange Dump 
Truck 
International Dump 
Truck 
Link Belt 1990 
(second asset of this 
type) 
Red River Bottom 
Trailer 
TOTAL 
Respondent's 
Declared 
Value of the 
Asset. 
$500.00 
$2,000.00 
$4,500.00 
$8,000.00 
$1,000.00 
not clear 
$1,000.00 
$8,000.00 
$15,000.00 
$101,000.00 
Income 
Ability 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
$100/hr 
Yes 
w/repairs 
Yes 
w/repairs 
Yes 
w/repairs 
Yes 
$100/hr 
Yes 
$85/hr 
Subject 
to Debt 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Awarded 
to 
Husband 
Husband 
Husband 
Husband 
Husband 
Husband 
Husband 
Husband 
Husband 
Record or 
Trial Exhibit 
No. 62 
p. 191 
p. 192 
p. 192 
pp.193 
&250 
Exhibit 62 
p. 193 
pp. 193 1 
&194 
P. 194 1 
P.195 1 
& 247-248 
P. 195 
&247 
&250 
The District Court clearly erred when it failed to provide permanent spousal support 
for the Petitioner of not less than $ 1,000.00 per month and to secure it with a judicial lien on 
the State Street real property awarded to the Respondent. 
The Division of Property by 
The Court was Grossly Unfair. 
In the Decree of Divorce, the trial court awarded all of the major income producing 
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assets to the Respondent. The Petitioner was awarded her home but subject to its debt. 
The State Street property is commercially zoned property. It was acquired during the 
marriage. (Trial Exhibit 8). The wife, at the very least, is entitled to a one-half (l/2) interest 
in the property. The commercial property is used by the business and therefore can be used 
for the production of rental income. No rent has ever been paid to the wife for the use of her 
property. 
The District Court committed clear error by not preserving (at the very least) the 
wife's one-half (V2) ownership interest in this asset. The wife's only request in this appeal 
as to property matters is for her ownership interest to be preserved. 
A Temporary or Final Order of Support 
Cannot be Retroactively Modified Once 
the Support Obligation has Become Due. 
As a rule of law, an award of temporary or permanent support (whether in the form 
of child support or spousal support) cannot be modified retroactively by the District Court. 
Jefferv L. Whitehead v. E. Ann Whitehead 836 P.2d 814 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (a case 
involving a temporary order of support); Gary Shelton v. Jervlin Shelton 885 P.2d 807 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (a case based upon a claim of fraud upon the court); Darwin W. Larsen v. 
VaLene P. Larsen 9 Ut.2d 160,340 P.2d 421 (Utah 1959) (requiring the payment of interest 
on the support delinquency); Florence McKay v. Earl McKay 13 Ut.2d 187, 370 P.2d 358 
(Utah 1962); Winslow Cole v. Marguerite Cole 101 Ut. 355, 122 P.2d 201 (Utah 1942) 
(requiring the payment of interest on the support debt). 
UCA §30-3-10.6( 1) provides that for each installment of the child support or alimony 
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required to be paid under any support order becomes on the date that it is due: (i) a judgment 
with the same attributes and effect of a District Court decree, (ii) is entitled to full faith and 
credit, and (iii) cannot be subject to retroactive modifications by the court or any court of 
another jurisdiction. 
However, a final order of support including a temporary order of support, can be 
retroactively modified where there as been a material misrepresentation of fact sufficient to 
amount to fraud upon the court. Gary Shelton v. Jerylin Shelton 885 P.2d 807 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994); Nina D. Bovce v. Milan M. Boyce 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980). In essence, whenever 
a party conceals or misrepresents assets or conceals income and as a result of that, there is 
a property or alimony award which would be greater or lesser than the amount actually 
granted, then relief can be retroactively granted by the court. Jeffery L. Whitehead v. E. Ami 
Whitehead 836 P.2d 814 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Gary Shelton v. Jerylin Shelton 885 P.2d 807 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). In this case, there is no evidence the wife concealed her income or 
sources of wealth. To the contrary, it is the Respondent who has not been forth coming as 
to past and current income both personally and as it relates to his various business entities. 
Before an award can be reactively changed, there must be clear proof of fraud upon 
the court that is committed by the other party. Gary Shelton v. Jerylin Shelton 885 P.2d 807 
(Utah App. 1994). The findings of fact are wholly void of any evidence of fraud upon the 
Court that was committed by the wife. (Record pp. 1108 to 1121). 
The rule of law dealing with retroactive modifications of support has been clearly 
stated by the Supreme Court and followed by the Court of Appeals. In the Whitehead case, 
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at page 816 of the opinion, the rule of law on this issue was again stated as follows: 
"Child and spousal support payments become unalterable debts as they accrue 
and courts cannot retroactively reduce or excuse past due support obligations." 
See also Frances E. Bernard v. John W. Atteburv 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981); Verona G. Scott 
v. Brigham D. Scott 19 Ut.2d 267, 430 P.2d 580 (Utah 1967); Michael J. Cummings v. 
Vonda Clegg Cummings 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991); Margret C. Openshaw v. Clarence 
R. Openshaw 102 Ut. 22, 126 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1942). 
A party cannot commit fraud upon the court and then seek relief from the court at the 
same time. The party is prevented from asking such under the doctrine of unclean hands. 
More importantly, the guilty party cannot gain an advantage as a result of the withholding 
of important financial evidence that he is required by law to have and present to the court. 
It is undisputed that Mr. Miller's own computer has the financial information necessary to 
prepare income tax returns. (Divorce Trial pp. 197 to 199, and 308). It is undisputed that 
he can compute a year to date profit and loss statement for his business in just "five seconds" 
when it serves his financial interests. (Divorce Trial p. 308). The Respondent chose not to 
provide the "elucidating" evidence. This failure can not be grounds to retroactively vacate 
the temporary alimony award. 
The Party Making a Claim for Attorney's Fees 
has the Burden of Proof to Establish the Right 
to the Award and the Amount of the Award. 
The party requesting an award of attorney's fees has the burden of presenting 
evidence sufficient to support the amount of the award and the legal right to such an award. 
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Robert Kurthv. Daniel R. Wiarda 1999 Utah Ct.App. 153,981 P.2d417 (Utah App/>: David 
L. Salmon v. Davis County 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996). A review of the drvorce trial record 
reveals this was done in this case. 
The Reasonableness of the Attorney's Fees Can Be 
Proven and Justified in a Number of Recognized Ways. 
The Trial Court is only required to award a reasonable amount of attorney's fees in 
a case. The reasonableness of the fees can be shown or proven in a number of recognized 
ways. There is no single method that must be followed in order to establish the amount and 
reasonableness of the attorney's fees incurred. The following methods have been approved 
by the courts in prior cases: 
1. The submission of an attorney's fee affidavit outlining the legal services, the 
amount of time spent on each task, and fees actually charged. Dejavue Inc. v. 
US Energy Corp. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 355, 993 P.2d 222 (Utah App.). This 
was done in this case twice. (Divorce Trial pp. 167 to 170; Record pp. 1067 
to 1075; Addendum No. 10, p. 72). 
2. The expert testimony of a local attorney substantiating the reasonableness of 
the fees in the case. Dejavue Inc. v. US Energy Corp. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 355, 
993 P.2d 222 (Utah App.); Associated Industrial Developments, Inc. v. J. Paul 
Jewkes 701 P.2d 486 (Utah 1984). This was done in this case through the 
testimony of W. Kevin Jackson, Esq. (Divorce Trial pp. 167 to 170). 
3. An evidentiary hearing in which actual testimony is taken by the Trial Court. 
David Winters v. Joanne Schulman 1999 Utah Ct. App. 119, 977 P.2d 1218 
(Utah App.); Associated Industrial Developments, Inc. v. J. Paul Jewkes 701 
P.2d 486 (Utah 1984). This was done in this case. (Divorce Trial pp. 167 to 
170). 
The party against whom the evidence is offered must do more than contend against 
it. The defending party has, at the very least, the duty to go forward with some meaningful 
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evidence to show that all or a specific portion of the fees are in fact unreasonable. The 
Respondent did not challenge or even cross examine the witness over the nature of the legal 
work performed and the amount of time spent on any given task on any given day. (Divorce 
Trial pp. 170 to 171). The claim asserted by the attorney for the Petitioner involves only 
those fees necessary to prepare for trial. This began about three (3) weeks prior to the trial. 
Where the Amount of Fees are Uncontested by 
Specific Evidence, then the Full Amount 
Claimed Should be Awarded Absent Specific 
Findings Supporting and Justifying the Reduction 
in the Total Amount Claimed. 
Where the fee claim is supported by admissible and competent evidence and where 
is not materially contested by an opposing party by specific evidence, then the Trial Court 
must make specific findings in order to justify reducing the amount of the attorney's fee 
claim. First General Service v. Zandra Perkins 918 P.2d 480 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Govert 
Copier Painting v. Craig Van Leeuwen 801 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (noting that the 
Trial Court must make specific Findings of Fact in order to reduce the total fee claim); Boyd 
J. Brown v. David K. Richards (II) 1999 Utah Ct. App. 109, 978 P.2d 470 (Utah App.). 
The specific reasons for the reduction in fees must in fact exist, they must be 
articulated by the Trial Court, and more importantly, they must be appropriate under the facts 
and the circumstances of the case. If specific facts are not present to justify the reduction in 
the amount of the fees, then the Trial Court has abused its discretion in the matter. Boyd J. 
Brown v. David K. Richards (II) 1999 Utah Ct. App. 109, 978 P.2d 470 (Utah App.). As a 
matter of law, the reduction of the fee claim was justified in this case. 
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The District Court Failed to 
Award Sufficient Defense and Legal Fees. 
UCA §30-3-3 allows the District Court to provide financial assistance in order for a 
spouse to obtain legal assistance in a domestic case. This can include funds necessary to 
prosecute or defend in a domestic case. Marita Muir v. Michael D. Muir 841 P.2d 736 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). The fees in this case were limited to these purposes. 
The Petitioner also sought court costs of $1,355.42. (Record pp. 1076 to 1080). The 
Petitioner also requested the sum of $9,000.00 for the legal services of W. Kevin Jackson for 
just the trial. (Record p. 1067; Addendum No. 10, p.72). The court allowed only $4,000.00 
and then supposedly reduced it further for the court costs that had been claimed and not 
objected to. (Contempt Trial pp. 9 and 24; Divorce Trial pp. 167 to 168). 
The wife's fee claim was supported by a detailed affidavit. (Record pp. 1067 to 
1075). The claimant also took the witness stand and gave proof under oath of the fees and 
the amounts claimed. (Divorce Trial pp. 167 to 172). The evidence was unrebutted and no 
significant concessions were made during the trial to reduce the fee claim. The Court should 
have awarded the full amount of the claim in the sum of $9,000.00. Marita Muir v. Michael 
D. Muir 841 P.2d 736 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). No claim for any of the legal fees of D. Hoyt 
are sought as part of this appeal. 
The District Court failed to make appropriate findings of fact sufficient to justify 
awarding only a reduced portion of the fee claim. Anthony W. Rudman v. Evelyn W. 
Rudman 812 P.2d 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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In contrast, the evidence is that Mr. Miller has paid at least $5,060.00 for his legal 
assistance in the case. (Trial Exhibit No. 37; Addendum No. 26, p. 167). It was also 
conceded that Mr. Miller's fees were in excess of $20,000.00. (Contempt Trial p. 19). This 
does not take into account the $35,567.00 paid to attorneys and trustees over a two (2) year 
period, (Trial Exhibit No. 37), and cash withdrawals from the business of $46,914.00 and 
$22,998.25 by Mr. Miller. (Trial Exhibit No. 50 and 51; Addendum Nos. 35 and 36). 
There is no evidence in this case that shows that Mr. Miller owes any fees to his 
lawyer because the business has been paying them all along. (Addendum No. 6, p. 89). Mr. 
Miller has the ability to pay the full amount of the wife's attorney's fees incurred in this case. 
Rule 54(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure 
Provides that the Prevailing Party May 
Recover Costs of the Proceeding. 
Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is the starting point for taxing costs 
of any civil action. Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "costs" 
are to be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party unless the court directs otherwise 
or where a statute or rule of law provides for a different result. In essence, the general rule 
is that the prevailing party is entitled to their litigation "costs" and that the "costs" are to be 
included in the judgment. Rule 54(d)(1) seems to suggest that the trial court has the 
discretion to not award a prevailing party his civil costs. It is presumed that there must be 
some specific justification for the denial of costs in a given case. Those reasons must be 
stated in the record. There are no finding of fact in the record which are sufficient to deny 
the Petitioner her costs of the action. 
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The Procedure for Taxing Costs 
is Set Forth in Rule 54 and Must 
be Complied by the Prevailing Party. 
The recoverable fees and costs are determined or computed when a party files their 
memorandum of costs and disbursements under Rule 54(d)(2) of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This portion of the rule requires that the party claiming the costs verify under 
oath that they were incurred as part of the case and describe the nature and the amount 
thereof. This has already occurred in this case. The Plaintiffs costs bill was verified. 
(Record pp. 1076 to 1080). 
Rule 54(d)(2) identifies the process by which the trial court reviews and determines 
the nature and the amount of "costs" to be recovered by the prevailing party. These costs are 
to be included as part of the judgment. Department of Social Services v. Mark Aaron 
Ruscetta 742 P.2d 114 (Utah App. 1987) (stating that the trial court is to make the initial 
determination of costs). An objection to the nature or to the amount of the claimed costs 
must be timely filed or it is waived by the party. Suniland Corporation v. Charles Ronald 
Radcliffe 576 P.2d 847 (Utah 1978). 
A party who is dissatisfied with all or a part of the costs claimed by the prevailing 
party must file a proper motion within seven (7) days after the prevailing party has filed its 
memorandum of costs to have the court determine the nature and amount of the recoverable 
costs. See also Ronald J. Nelson v. T.G. Newman 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978); Suniland 
Corporation v. Charles Ronald Radcliffe 576 P.2d 847 (Utah 1978). 
Rule 54(e) specifically provides that the final judgment should include any interest 
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awarded and the total amount of costs taxed by the court. 
The Prevailing Party is Entitled to Recover 
these Costs and Disbursements in this Action. 
The Petitioner has filed her required Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements in this 
action. (Record pp. 1076-1080). It is dated the 19th day of August, 1999. The memorandum 
claims costs and disbursements in the sum of $1,355.42. The memorandum was filed within 
five (5) days after the entry of the judgment. The memorandum of costs can be filed in 
advance of the entry of a final judgment. In this case, its was filed well in advance of the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce. The court entered a Decree of Divorce in favor of the 
Petitioner on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. (Record p. 1123, %l; Addendum 
No. 4, p. 34). 
The Unpaid Debt Obligations 
Accrue Interest at the Statutory Rate. 
The temporary order of support required the payment of specific and fixed sums of 
money to the Petitioner. The specific support amounts were clearly known and can be fixed 
with mathematical certainty on a month to month basis. UCA §15-1-1 provides that when 
an obligation matures, then interest accrues on the delinquency at the rate of 10% per annum. 
Harrington Properties v. Marilyn H. Peterson 973 P.2d 1004 Utah App. 1999). 
The debt obligation accrued monthly and therefore, the interest should compound 
monthly since it too becomes a fixed and known obligation each and every month. Ron 
Davies v. Timothy R. Olson Davies 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987). The award of interest 
is mandatory once an obligation matures. Mount Trucking v. Entrada Industries 802 P.2d 
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779 (Utah App. 1990). 
The unpaid spousal support and child support should accrue interest at the rate of 10% 
annum and should be compounded monthly as shown in Petitioner's Trial Exhibits 45 and 
46. (Addendum Nos. 31 and 32). A judgment for the arrearages should have been included 
in the Decree of Divorce in the amounts shown in each trial exhibit. 
The Judgment Must Identify 
the Judgment Debtor and Include 
Specific Information. 
Rule 4-504(6) of the Code of Judicial Administration provides that every decree or 
judgment shall contain the last known address and social security account number of the 
Judgment Debtor where such is known to the court or to the parties. This is a requirement 
of the law. In domestic cases, this is also required by the provisions of UCA §78-45-7.22 
and UCA §30-3-10.17. The Decree of Divorce omits this required identification information. 
(Record pp. 1122 tol 131). 
X. CONCLUSION 
The orders and decrees of the District Court relating to contempt should be vacated. 
The sanctions and judgments should be setaside for lack of personal jurisdiction. The facts 
complained of do not support a claim of contempt even when considered in the light most 
favorable to Respondent. There was insufficient evidence presented during the trial to prove 
contempt by clear and convincing evidence. 
The Decree of Divorce should be amended in the following particulars: 
1. Reinstatement of the temporary alimony support and which should then be 
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reduced to a judgment in the Decree of Divorce. 
2. Permanent alimony should be awarded in the sum of $1,000.00 per month 
effective August 1999. 
3. That child support be computed on the proven income of the parents as shown 
by the evidence effective August 1999. 
4. A judicial lien placed upon all real property of the Respondent (or his business 
interests) to secure payment of the judgment and to ensure future compliance with financial 
obligations under the Decree of Divorce. 
5. The award of costs at the trial level of $1,355.42. 
6. For interest (compounded monthly) on support arrearages to be reduced to a 
judgment. 
7. The award of $9,000.00 in attorney's fees plus a remand for the legal costs on 
appeal and the award of additional fees in defending the contempt charges in the sum of 
$5,429.50. 
8. For an award of one-half (14) interest in the commercial property located on 
State Street and that the same be deed to her from the Respondent or the business entities he 
controls. 
DATED this 30th day of August, 2000. 
w . f f i y m j A C O O N 
Attorney at] Law \y 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered in person (or caused to be delivered) a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to the following: 
James H. Woodall Martha Pierce 
Littlefield & Peterson Office of the Guardian ad Litem 
426 South 500 East 450 South State Street, W-22 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
by delivery to the law offices at the parties as shown above, dated the 30th day of August, 
2000. 
10/MILL-APL.BRF 
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